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A Tale of Two Standards: Economics Applied to
Patent Law’s Fluctuating Utility Requirement
Brian A. Harris*

I.

Introduction
The American patent system, codified by the United States Congress, 1 consists of a

complex statutory framework that governs the patent monopoly. The patent grant is often
considered more powerful than other monopolistic intellectual property grants such as copyrights
or trademarks;2 the patent grant allows the holder to exclude all others from practicing his patent
for the entire term of the patent. 3 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (the
“USPTO”), however, will only grant a patent if certain statutory requirements are met.4 Before
receiving a patent, inventors are required to demonstrate that their invention is “useful.”5 The
requisite level of utility that an inventor must demonstrate to the USPTO has varied throughout
American history. In the early 19th century, Justice Joseph Story defined a utility test that
became ubiquitous in American patent law.6 The test, simply stated, deemed all inventions that

*

The author is a class of 2012 J.D. candidate at the Seton Hall University School of Law.
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006).
2
Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual
Property, 5 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3, 6-7 (1991).
3
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain…a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns,
of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States…”); Besen & Raskind, supra note 2, at 7.
4
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-123; Besen & Raskind, supra note 2, at 7.
5
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added).
6
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); W. PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE REMEDIES IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS
141 (American Stationers’ Co. 1837) (explaining Justice Story’s standard is “now universally
adopted in the United States”).
1

were not injurious to society or against public policy to be “useful.”7 This minimalist standard of
utility applied to all patent applications until the middle of the 20th century.
As the world grew in complexity, the United States Supreme Court held that a more
stringent utility standard was necessary for patentable chemical inventions. 8

The Court

determined that for a chemical process or compound to meet the requisite level of utility
necessary for the patent grant, the inventor must demonstrate substantial, specific utility in the
chemical invention’s present form. 9 Today, all chemical inventions seeking the patent grant
must still pass this overly rigorous utility test.10
This paper argues that, in the ever-evolving arena of chemistry, Justice Story’s utility
standard is economically preferable to the strict and burdensome utility standard set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson.11 By applying different economic theories
to intellectual property rights, economists, lawyers, and legislators can accurately approximate
the optimal balance between providing incentives to creators while persevering the public’s right
of access to their creations.12 Section II of this article details the origin of the American patent
system and its utility requirement. Section III explores the fluctuating utility requirement from
its inception to its modern standard. Finally, Section IV of this paper applies the net benefit rule
and the average cost theory to both Justice Story’s utility standard and the Brenner utility

7

Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35, 16 L. Ed. 2d 69, 80, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 1042 (1966).
9
Id.
10
Dev A. Ghose, A Proposal to Modify the Utility Standard for Patenting Biotechnology
Research Tools, 56 EMORY L.J. 1661, 1675-80 (2007).
11
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535.
12
David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 96 (2010)
(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”)); Besen & Raskind,
supra note 2, at 6-7.
8

2

standard in the field of chemistry and concludes that a more relaxed utility standard is beneficial
for both inventors and the American public.
II.

Patents Generally
A patent is an exclusive right granted to an inventor from his government that allows the

inventor to protect his invention.13 The patent right is granted in different ways by governments
around the world based on each government’s legal system.14 The general process of acquiring a
patent requires an individual to file an application for the patent with his government; after an
inspection, the government will grant the exclusive right for a specific term of years if the
application meets all the statutory criteria for patent protection.15 During this term, the patent
owner is not required to use or practice the patent; rather, the owner is granted the authority to
prevent others from practicing the patent without consent.16
There are two main justifications for patent protection: (1) to encourage innovation and
(2) to require public disclosure.17 First, a patent system is necessary to avoid the “inventor’s
paradox;” this occurs when an inventor cannot reap monetary rewards for his invention because
he fears that the invention will be stolen and duplicated if he publicly sells it.18 Without patent

13

Katie Lula, How to See a Jar of Peanut Butter: Evaluating Empirical Studies of Patents and
Patent Law, 7 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 151, 154 (2007) (“a right or title that is
conferred by ‘a government authority to an individual or organization [...]. The sole right to
make, use, or sell some invention [...].’”) (quoting THE CANADIAN OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1138 (Oxford University Press 2004)).
14
Lula, supra note 13, at 154.
15
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (“…such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed
in the United States…”); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3
(Princeton University Press 2004).
16
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 15, at 3.
17
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 49
(LexisNexis Publishing 2002).
18
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 66 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2001)
(“Any potential buyer, of course, will not pay a high price, or perhaps any price at all, unless
3

protection, inventors would be far less likely to share their inventions and ideas, which would
stifle creation.19 With patent protection, however, the “inventor’s paradox” is eliminated, and
inventors can earn income through “patent licensing, joint ventures, and strategic alliances.”20
Secondly, a patent system provides public disclosure of all new inventions. 21 The
government that grants the patent offers certain statutory protection as a quid pro quo for the
inventor’s coherent disclosure of the invention.22 According to author Robert M. Sherwood,
“[t]he history of intellectual property is essentially the emergence of recognition that a
community benefits when it encourages its creative and inventive people by honoring the
products of their minds.” 23

Thus, all patent systems theoretically encourage creation,

commercial activity, and public disclosure at a national level.
III.

The American Patent Utility Standard
A.

The Origin of United States Patent Law

The origin of United States patent law can be traced to the United States Constitution.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, commonly referred to as the Patent and Copyright Clause,
empowers Congress to “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and

sufficient details are disclosed. The inventor, however, does not want to disclose too much, for
fear the would-be buyer will instead become an independent producer of the invention's
commercial embodiment, and a competitor of the true inventor. The inventor's paradox may be
solved by a patent, which gives the inventor the freedom to disclose without fear of self-induced
competition.”).
19
Lula, supra note 13, at 157.
20
KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER TOOL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 9 (2d ed.
2003).
21
35 U.S.C. §§ 112-113; Lula, supra note 13, at 159.
22
Id. at 159.
23
Robert M. Sherwood, Human Creativity for Economic Development: Patents Propel
Technology 33 AKRON L. REV. 351, 352 (2000).
4

Discoveries.”24 In 1790, Congress initially codified the American patent system, 25 which was
soon amended and followed by the Patent Act of 1793.26 Over the course of the past 200 years,
Congress has modified the patent statutes several times.27 Today, the Patent Act of 1952 is the
current statute governing patents in the United States.28 To receive a patent from the USPTO, an
inventor must demonstrate four requirements: (1) statutory subject matter, (2) utility, (3) novelty,
and (4) nonobviousness.29 Additionally, the inventor must provide a written disclosure sufficient
to instruct others how to recreate his invention.30
This paper specifically examines the required level of utility an inventor must
demonstrate to receive the patent grant. Because the statutory language only vaguely states that
“useful” inventions will receive the patent grant, the definition of “useful” has largely been left
to the judicial branch for interpretation.31
B.

The Story Standard

In Bedford v. Hunt, Justice Story examined what level of utility was required to be
demonstrated to receive the patent grant.

32

After the plaintiff brought suit for patent

infringement, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s patent should not have been granted
because his invention lacked usefulness.33

24

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790).
26
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (1793); see also N. Scott Pierce, In re Dane K.
Fisher: An Exercise in Utility, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 2 (2006).
27
Ghose, supra note 10, at 1665.
28
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et
seq. (2006)).
29
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1664.
30
35 U.S.C. § 112; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1664.
31
35 U.S.C. § 101; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1664.
32
Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
33
Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
25

5

In deciding the case, the court first summarized the language of the Patent Act of 1793
stating “[n]o person is entitled to a patent under the act of congress unless he has invented some
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used
before.”34 Interpreting the statute, Justice Story found that Congress intended to establish a very
minimal utility requirement. 35 The court held that the inventor need not establish that his
invention supersedes all others in a particular field; rather, it explained that Congress envisioned
giving the patent grant to inventions that were not “injurious to the morals, the health, or the
good order of society.” 36 He proposed that an invention should be patentable if it has no
obnoxious tendencies and if it may be applied to a practical use. 37 Thus, in coming to its
conclusion, the court did not focus on the invention’s degree of utility, but rather focused on the
invention not being contrary to public policy.38
C.

The Spread of the Story Standard

Justice Story’s utility analysis spread from the Massachusetts Circuit to the Pennsylvania
Circuit in Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank.39 There, the invention in question was a modification to
the common rolling press that allowed the press to print either double-sided copper-plates or
single-sided copper-plates on one side and single-sided letter press on the other.40 The machine
was designed to help prevent counterfeit notes.41

34

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. (“If its practical utility be very limited, it will follow, that it will be of little or no profit to
the inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect. The law, however, does not look
to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, and that the use is such
as sound morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit.”).
38
Id.; Pierce, supra note 26, at 5.
39
Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 14 F. Cas. 746 (C.C.D. Pa. 1820).
40
Kneass, 14 F. Cas. at 747.
41
Id. (“…as an additional security against counterfeiture.”).
35

6

The defendant claimed the invention was not patentable because it lacked utility. 42 The
court dismissed the defendant’s defense by posing this question: if the invention lacked utility,
why did the defendant copy and manufacture the patented invention?43 The court then recited
Justice Story’s statutory interpretation whereby if an invention is not injurious or against public
policy and is not worthless, then the invention meets the necessary utility threshold. 44 Therefore,
the modified rolling press was found to satisfy the utility requirement.45
In 1837, Willard Phillips stated in his treatise that Justice Story’s utility analysis was
“now universally adopted in the United States.”46 During this same time period, the patent law
utility requirement and novelty requirement clearly diverged into two separate analyses. 47
Scholars began to draw a sharp distinction between relative utility and positive utility.48 In 1849,
G.T. Curtis published a patent treatise interpreting the Patent Act of 183649 explaining Congress’
intention to bifurcate the Constitutional requirements of “new” and “useful.”50 Curtis explained

42

Id. at 748.
Id. (“If the plaintiff's invention correspond substantially with the thing used by the defendants,
how can the latter be permitted to say, that the thing so discovered and used is worthless?”).
44
Id. (“In the case of Lowell v. Lewis…Justice Story, commenting upon this subject, lays it
down, that the law only requires that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well
being, good policy, and sound morals of society. ‘The word ‘useful,’ therefore, he adds, ‘is
incorporated into the act, in contradiction to mischievous, or immoral.’”) (quoting Lowell v.
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817)).
45
Kneass, 14 F. Cas. at 747.
46
PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 141.
47
Pierce, supra note 26, at 7-8 (citing G. T. CURTIS, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Charles C. Little and James Brown
1849)) (“The Patent Act now in force in this country requires that the subject of every patent
should be "new and useful," whether it be an art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or an improvement on any of these things. The inquiry that meets us on the threshold is,
what constitutes novelty, and what constitutes utility, in the sense of the statute?”) [hereinafter,
CURTIS I].
48
CURTIS I, supra note 47, at 3.
49
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
50
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; CURTIS I, supra note 47, at 3 (citing Justice Story’s opinion in
Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (D. Mass. 1825)) (“It gives the first inventor, or discoverer of
43
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that the terms were to be viewed separately in their conjunctive form and that the analysis of
each be independent. 51 To receive a patent, an invention was required to be “new;” 52 this
analysis tested the invention’s relative utility.53 The invention must be substantially different
than any invention in the prior art. 54 This relative utility should not be confused with the
minimalist positive utility standard set forth by Justice Story, which describes the “useful” aspect
of an invention. 55 Thus, throughout the 19th century, the statutory utility requirement was
distinct in its own analysis and quite minimalistic.
D.

Departure from the Story Standard in the Field of Chemistry

In the field of chemistry, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the
“CCPA”) began to take a stricter stance on the utility requirement in in re Bremner. 56 The
invention in question was a process for a production of polymers. 57 The patent application,
however, only explicitly described the steps in the process and failed to demonstrate any use,
which is why the Board of Appeals within the Patent Office (the “Board”) denied the patent

the thing, the exclusive right, and asks nothing as to the mode or extent of the application of his
genius to conceive or execute it. It must also be useful, that is, it must not be noxious or
mischievous, but capable of being applied to good purposes; and perhaps it may also be a just
interpretation of the law, that it meant to exclude things absolutely frivolous and foolish. But the
degree of positive utility is less important in the eye of the law, than some other things, though in
regard to the inventor, as a measure of the value of the invention, it is of the highest
importance.”).
51
CURTIS I, supra note 47, at 3.
52
5 Stat. at 117.
53
G. T. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS, 110 (Little,
Brown and Co. 4th ed. 1873) (“Care must be taken, however, to discriminate between what may
be called the positive utility of an invention, which is made by the statute a mere description of
the class of inventions which can be the subjects of valid patents, and that comparative or
relative utility which is sometimes applied as one of the tests of novelty, or substantial difference
of structure or mode of operation.”) [hereinafter, CURTIS II].
54
Pierce, supra note 26, at 13 (citing Curtis II, supra note 53, at 110).
55
Pierce, supra note 26, at 14.
56
In re Bremner, 182 F.2d 216 (1950).
57
Id.
8

grant.58 The CCPA upheld the Board’s decision holding that all patent applications are required
to demonstrate a use.59 The court concluded “[t]here is nothing in the application which asserts
utility nor any thing indicating what [the] use of the product may be made.”60 This decision
began a trend to deviate from, at least in the field of chemistry, the minimalist standard set forth
by Justice Story.61
As a result of the lack of a uniform utility test for chemical inventions throughout the
courts, the United States Supreme Court examined patent law’s utility requirement in Brenner v.
Manson. 62 Respondent Andrew Manson was a chemist who filed a patent application for a
process that made particular steroids.63 The application was rejected by a USPTO examiner, and
the rejection was affirmed by the Board. 64 Both the examiner and the Board cited that the
application omitted any cognizable use.65 Manson, in an effort to cure his application, directed
the Board to an article in a well-renowned chemistry periodical that revealed the steroid in
question was related to other research, which had demonstrated some scientific promise of
reducing the effects of tumors in mice.66 The Board firmly held, however, “our view that the
statutory requirement of usefulness of a product cannot be presumed merely because it happens
to be closely related to another compound which is known to be useful.”67

58

Id.
Id. (“It is our view that no ‘hard and fast’ ruling properly may be made fixing the extent of the
disclosure of utility necessary in an application, but we feel certain that the law requires that
there be in the application an assertion of utility and an indication of the use or uses intended.”).
60
Id.
61
Pierce, supra note 26, at 21.
62
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 519; Pierce, supra note 26, at 21-31.
63
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 520-21.
64
Id. at 521.
65
Id. (“The ground for rejection was the failure ‘to disclose any utility for’ the chemical
compound produced by the process.”).
66
Id. at 522.
67
Id.
59

9

On appeal, the CCPA reversed the Board’s decision holding that Manson was entitled to
the patent.68 The CCPA attempted to restore Justice Story’s utility standard holding “where a
claimed process produces a known product it is not necessary to show utility for the product,” so
long as the product “is not alleged to be detrimental to the public interest.”69 The government
appealed, and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court to resolve the conflict
of what constitutes utility in a chemical process.70
At the Supreme Court, Manson advanced several different arguments in his attempt to
establish the requisite level of utility.71 First, he claimed that his compound has a specific utility
in that it produces an adjacent homologue that inhibits the effects of tumors in mice. 72 The
Court, dissatisfied with Manson’s evidence that the process would routinely yield a tumor
inhibiting homologue, rejected this argument.73
Next, Manson claimed that the chemical process was useful simply because (1) it
produces the intended compound, or alternatively (2) produces a compound belonging to a class
of steroids that are under intensive scientific exploration. 74 The Court, exploring several
arguments by both the respondent and the petitioner, articulated a critical component of the
patent quid pro quo that weighed in favor of Manson: the public benefit of disclosure.75 The

68

In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 238 (1964).
Id. at 237.
70
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 523.
71
Id. at 530-34.
72
Id. at 532.
73
Id. (“Indeed, respondent himself recognized that the presumption that adjacent homologues
have the same utility has been challenged in the steroid field because of ‘a greater known
unpredictability of compounds in that field.’ In these circumstances and in this technical area,
we would not overturn the finding of the Primary Examiner, affirmed by the Board of Appeals
and not challenged by the CCPA.”).
74
Id. at 532.
75
Id. at 533 (“It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage
dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”).
69

10

Court, however, evaluated that benefit against the dangers of the grant of a monopoly along with
the potential for scientists to abuse and block off certain areas of research with a patent.76 The
Court reasoned that Congress intended to require inventors to demonstrate “substantial” utility
before the government granted the patent monopoly.77
Additionally, the Court stated that a compound’s potential for further study was an
insufficient demonstration of utility. 78 Here, the Court analogized the granting of a patent at
such an early stage to a license to hunt; the Court stated, though, that the patent grant should be
given as a reward for a successful conclusion to the hunt, rather than just the opportunity to
hunt.79
Ultimately, the Court rejected Justice Story’s standard noting that it shed little light on
the subject of chemical processes.80 The Court reasoned “many things in this world which may
not be considered ‘useful’ but which, nevertheless, are totally without a capacity for harm.”81
Thus, the Court rejected the inverse correlation between harm and usefulness that was at the key
of Justice Story’s utility standard.82
Finally, the Court held that for a chemical process to meet the requisite utility standard
deserving of the quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and Congress for the patent

76

Id. at 534.
Id.
78
Id. at 535-36.
79
Id. (“This is not to say that we mean to disparage the importance of contributions to the fund
of scientific information short of the invention of something ‘useful,’ or that we are blind to the
prospect that what now seems without ‘use’ may tomorrow command the grateful attention of
the public. But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion.”).
80
Id. at 534.
81
Id.
82
See id.
77
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grant, the process must demonstrate three specific criteria.83

The inventor must establish (1)

“substantial” utility refined to a point where (2) “specific” benefit (3) “exists in [a] currently
available form.”84 Applying this new standard to the facts of Brenner, the Court found that
Manson had not sufficiently demonstrated utility and rejected his application for the patent.85
Many critics disagreed with the 7-2 majority in Brenner, including Justice Harlan who
authored the dissent. 86 Justice Harlan’s argument, formed from a public policy perspective,
claimed that an invention could achieve the minimum threshold of utility “simply because it
facilitates further research into possible product uses.”87 Justice Harlan explained that the field
of chemistry has brought humanity many tangible benefits, but those benefits are often a result of
building discoveries from their predecessors. 88 Justice Harlan believed that if chemists are
refused patents due to a lack of “substantial” utility, then the scientific community would share
significantly less information with the public, which would stunt the growth of knowledge in the
scientific community.89

83

Id. at 535.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 536 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 537 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“What I find most troubling about the result reached by the
Court is the impact it may have on chemical research. Chemistry is a highly interrelated field and
a tangible benefit for society may be the outcome of a number of different discoveries, one
discovery building upon the next. To encourage one chemist or research facility to invent and
disseminate new processes and products may be vital to progress, although the product or
process be without "utility" as the Court defines the term, because that discovery permits
someone else to take a further but perhaps less difficult step leading to a commercially useful
item.”).
84
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Several other critics of the Brenner decision observed that the Court failed to analyze the
statute utilizing the proper rules of statutory construction.90 The Court used modifiers such as
“substantial” and “specific” in front of the word “utility,” but those adjectives cannot be found
anywhere in the statutory text. 91 The Court’s reading departs rom a verbis legis non est
recendundum, or “from the words of the law, there must be no departure.”92
Additionally, critics argued that the Court has confused positive utility, which is the
section 101 analysis discussed in this article, and relative utility, which is analyzed in the
specification section of the patent application pursuant to section 112. 93 Positive utility is
derived from the plain meaning of the word “useful,” which means capable of being put to use.94
This definition represents the minimal utility standard set forth by Justice Story.95
By requiring “substantial” and “specific” utility for chemical processes, the Court set a
murky precedent that is hard to define and enforce uniformly. 96 Because the Court in Brenner
failed to give further guidance regarding the new chemical invention utility standard, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the “CAFC”) further developed the standard via case law.
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the CAFC struggled to make a black and white rule on
what would be considered “substantial” and “specific” utility.97

90

Eric P. Mirabel, A Review or Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: “Practical Utility” Is a Useless Concept, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 811, 813-14 (1987).
91
35 U.S.C. § 101; Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535; Mirabel, supra note 90, at 814.
92
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 124 (5th ed. 1979).
93
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112; Mirabel, supra note 90, at 815.
94
Id.
95
Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
96
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535; Mirabel, supra note 90, at 814.
97
Pierce, supra note 26, at 45-53.
13

In 1995, the CAFC liberalized the chemical process utility requirement in in re Brana.98
There, both the USPTO examiner and the Board found that an application for a new chemical
lacked utility.99 Both the examiner and the Board, however, were confused whether the patent
application failed to satisfy the section 101 “substantial” utility threshold or the section 112
specification requirement.100 The applicant presented a chemical compound that he asserted was
useful for anti-tumor activity.101 The applicant claimed his compound was an improvement over
other compounds that were published in a scientific article.102 Additionally, he relied on two
model tests that demonstrated high efficacy in reducing the effects of lymphocytic leukemia.103
The CAFC overturned the Board’s ruling and held that, based upon the preceding
evidence, the application satisfied the section 101 utility requirement.104 Interestingly, the level
of “substantial” and “specific” utility the inventor in Brana demonstrated was roughly equivalent
to the level of utility that Manson disclosed in Brenner. The CAFC in Brana, however, never
cited to the Brenner Court once.105 This loosening of the utility requirement would nonetheless
revert to the strict standard that Brenner established in the decade to follow.
Prior to 1995, the USPTO was silent on the issue of the utility threshold in chemical
inventions. 106 Between 1995 and 2001, the USPTO addressed the utility requirement three

98

In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1564.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1565.
102
Id.
103
Id. (“Since one of the tested compounds, NSC 308847, was found to be highly effective
against these two lymphocytic leukemia tumor models, applicants’ favorable comparison
implicitly asserts that their claimed compounds are highly effective (i.e. useful) against
lymphocytic leukemia.”).
104
Id. at 1566.
105
See generally id.; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1670.
106
Mary Breen Smith, An End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome Project Versus the United
States Patent and Trademark Office's 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 747, 766
99

14

different times issuing Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with the
Utility Requirement (the “Guidelines”). 107 First, in 1995, amidst a series of criticisms, the
USPTO effectively relaxed the utility standard for biotechnology inventions.108 Essentially, if
the applicant could assert any use whatsoever, then the patent examiner was to approve the
application with respect to the utility element. 109 Additionally, examiners were instructed to
accept the application’s statements as true, unless they had countervailing evidence. 110 Thus,
applicants were no longer required to provide substantial evidence linking their process with a
specific use, as the Court required of Manson in Brenner.111
In 1999, the USPTO revisited the topic of utility. 112 Several critics argued that the
“credible” Guidelines issued in 1995 did not comport with the Brenner holding and the USPTO
did not have the authority to relax a standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court
without an act of Congress.113 By 2001, the Guidelines were clear that “specific, substantial, and

(2002) (“Despite decisions that have modified and softened the Brenner rule, until 1995 the
Patent Board followed Brenner strictly.”).
107
Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263, (July 14, 1995) [hereinafter, 1995
Guidelines]; Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440, (Dec. 21, 1999) [hereinafter,
1999 Guidelines]; Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092 (Jan. 5, 2001)
[hereinafter, 2001 Guidelines].
108
1995 Guidelines, supra note 107, at 36,264 (“if the applicant has asserted that the claimed
invention is useful for any particular purpose (i.e. a ‘specific utility’) and that assertion would be
considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art, do not impose a rejection based on
lack of utility.”).
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made by an applicant in relation to an asserted utility, unless countervailing evidence can be
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credible utility” was to be demonstrated before a patent could meet the requirements of section
101.114 Although the USPTO caused the utility standard to fluctuate, by 2001 it was returned to
the strict Brenner standard.
After the 2001 Guidelines were released, the CAFC reviewed the Board’s rejection of
Dane Fisher’s application to patent certain nucleic acid molecules for lack of utility in in re
Fisher. 115 The CAFC carefully analyzed Fisher’s seven articulated utilities for the patent finding
he had only demonstrated general utility.116 Ignoring the liberalization of the utility requirement
it had set forth in Brana, the court focused on the “substantial” utility requirement mandated by
the Court in Brenner.117 Additionally, the CAFC gave judicial notice to the 2001 Guidelines.118
Ultimately, the CAFC substantiated the Board’s analysis, denied the application, and returned
the utility requirement to the standard the Court set forth in Brenner.119
E.

Summary of the Two Utility Standards

Thus, since the enactment of the Patent Act of 1790, two distinct utility standards have
been established through case law.

First, Justice Story’s minimalist standard (the “Story

Standard”), which applied to all patentable subject matter and found utility in all inventions not

that PTO examination procedures would result in granting patents based on nonspecific and
nonsubstantial utilities, contrary to established case law.”).
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2001 Guidelines, supra note 107, at 1,094 (“The utility requirement, as explained by the
courts, only requires that the inventor disclose a practical or real world benefit available from the
invention, i.e., a specific, substantial and credible utility.”).
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In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Id. at 1370 (“It argues that Fisher failed to meet that standard because Fisher's alleged uses
are so general as to be meaningless.”).
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Id. at 1369 (citing Brenner, 383 U.S. at 519).
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Id. at 1370 (“The government contends that a patent applicant need disclose only a single
specific and substantial utility pursuant to Brenner, the very standard articulated in the PTO’s
‘Utility Examination Guidelines’…and followed here when examining the ‘643 application.”).
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Id. at 1379.
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pernicious or against public policy.120 Second, the standard the Court announced in Brenner (the
“Brenner Standard”), which applies strictly to patentable chemical inventions and requires
“substantial” utility that demonstrates a “specific” benefit “exist[ing] in [a] currently available
form.”121 Part IV of this article analyzes both standards applied to chemical inventions from an
economic perspective and asserts that the Story Standard is preferable for all patentable subject
matter.
IV.

Economic Principles Applied to the Patent Utility Standard
The economic objective of intellectual property law is to provide enough incentive to the

creators of intellectual property so that they will bear the cost of creation. 122 Additionally,
intellectual property rights should not be so exclusive that the public cannot share and use the
creators’ intellectual property. 123 Economists and legal analysts often differ on how to best
achieve the optimal balance between providing incentives to creators and access to the public.
From his perspective, an inventor will only invest in the creation of intellectual property
if he receives what he perceives to be an appropriate return.124 The inventor’s ability to collect a
sufficient return is dependent on his ability to collect, in some form, a portion of the value that
the public places in the invention.125 If the intellectual property legal system in place does not
permit the inventor to collect enough value from the public for his invention, then the inventor
will cease to invent.126 The most prevalent reason why an inventor would not be able to collect a
sufficient return for his invention is if one of his competitors were able to replicate his invention
120
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at little or no cost. 127 Similarly, if others are able to expand upon an underlying invention
without returning value to the original inventor, then the original inventor loses a significant
amount of incentive to invent. Thus, an intellectual property legal system is required to give
some form of rights to inventors in order to provide enough incentive to invent.128
Legislators and regulators, however, must analyze incentives from the public’s
perspective as well.129 If the rights given to an inventor are too exclusive, then the invention
may not be widely used.130 If the invention is not widely used, then society may be in the same
position it would be if there were a suboptimal reward for innovation, but all innovation was
widely disseminated. 131 Both scenarios are economically inefficient and, therefore, hinder
innovation. Thus, it is critical for a legal system to find the appropriate balance between inventor
incentives and public access.
There are multiple economic theories applicable to intellectual property rights that seek
this optimal balance between inventor incentives and public access.132 The cost-benefit theory
compares and contrasts the costs and benefits that are produced from either expanding
intellectual property rights and restricting public access or, alternatively, restricting intellectual
property rights and expanding public access.133 Other economists prefer the average cost theory,
which proposes that an optimal legal system should provide exactly enough incentive to cover
the average inventor’s costs.134
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While both theories have their advantages and disadvantages, the cost-benefit approach is
slightly more practical in determining the optimal level of intellectual property rights. 135 First,
the average cost approach fails to account for the social benefits that are created by new
intellectual property or the social benefits gained by increased access to intellectual property. 136
The magnitude of an inventor’s cost is not the sole consideration that should be taken account in
the balancing equation; social value is an important factor that needs to be included.137 Second,
the average cost theory creates the market presumption that an inventor’s cost will always be
covered, which may lead to an inaccurate analysis. 138 The idea that an inventor’s cost will
always be covered strays from the conventional wisdom that structures a free-market
economy.139 Finally, the average cost of acquiring a patent is a variable that is highly correlated
with the patent legal system.140 If the legal system changes, then the average cost of acquiring a
patent will also change.141 Nevertheless, both theories are presented below and, when applied to
the Story Standard and the Brenner Standard, they both reach similar conclusions.
A.

The Cost-Benefit and Net Benefit Approach

The fundamental question in the cost-benefit analysis is whether granting increased rights
to the creators of intellectual property outweighs the social benefits that would be lost by

an author or inventor to create more intellectual property); see also F. Scott Kieff, Property
Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727 (2001).
135
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restricting public access.142 Thus, intellectual property rights should be expanded if the benefit
from the expansion is greater than the resulting cost to public access. Conversely, intellectual
property rights should be restricted if the reduced incentives to inventors are outweighed by the
benefit to public access.
The net benefit theory uses the fundamental principles of the cost-benefit approach, but
allows economists studying intellectual property to view the original formula from a slightly
more practical angle. The net benefit thoery recognizes that both inventor incentives and public
access can be viewed as a benefit from one perspective while simultaneously being viewed as a
cost from another perspective.143 An increase in inventor incentives is a benefit to inventors and
may produce more intellectual property; this, however, will increase the public’s cost of
accessing the intellectual property. Vice versa, an increase in public access will allow more
people to benefit from inventors’ intellectual property, but it may reduce the total amount of
intellectual property due to a lack of incentives. Therefore, to simplify the analysis, the net
benefit rule eliminates perspectives. When applied to intellectual property, the net benefit rule
weighs the overall value of an increase in intellectual property rights against the overall value of
an increase in public access.144 Thus, the net benefit principle proposes:
1.

An increase in exclusive rights to intellectual property is justified only
when the value of increased creative activity resulting from increased
incentives is greater than the value of the benefits lost from reduced
access.
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2.

An increase in access to intellectual property is justified only when the
value of the benefits resulting from increased access is greater than the
value of decreased creative activity resulting from decreased incentives.145

Following these principles, it is important to analyze the incremental effect on all factors
when considering increasing or decreasing intellectual property rights and public access.
B.

Applying the Net Benefit Rule to the Patent Law Utility Requirement

The Story Standard requires a minimal demonstration of usefulness from an inventor.146
Comparing the Story Standard to the more burdensome Brenner Standard,147 it is clear that an
inventor is more likely to meet the utility threshold required for the patent grant under the Story
Standard. Applying both standards to potentially patentable chemical inventions, it easier for an
inventor to simply demonstrate that his invention is not a danger to society rather than proving
the invention has a “specific” and “substantial” use in its current form. Consequently, because it
easier for an inventor to receive patent protection under the Story Standard, a reversion to this
standard from the Brenner Standard would be viewed as an increase in intellectual property
protection. Applying the net benefit rule, this increase in intellectual property rights would only
be justified if the net benefit of the increased inventor creativity is greater than the net benefit of
the reduced right of access.
If the Story Standard governed potentially patentable chemical inventions, the patent
system would grant the exclusive right to a monopoly over the invention at an earlier stage of the
inventor’s research.

This would ultimately reduce the cost of obtaining a patent because

inventors would not have to further invest in discovering a specific use for the chemical
compound they discovered prior to filing a patent application. Consequently, more inventors
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would apply for chemical invention patents, and their applications would be more likely to
survive the examiner’s scrutiny.

An increase in patents would result in an increase of

disclosures.
The increase in patents and disclosures benefits both inventors and society for several
reasons. First, an increase in disclosures would result in an increase of information in the public
domain after the inventor’s patent window lapses. While the public would not have a right to use
any of the inventions or the material in their disclosures without the permission of the inventor
during the patent period, an increase of information in the public domain would lead to quicker
technological development at a macro level.
Second, the increase in disclosures would lead to an increase in license agreements
between scientists. Under the Story Standard, a scientist may invent a chemical compound and
patent it without knowing its specific use. Hypothetically, after the inventor has patented the
compound, other scientists could enter into a licensing agreement with the inventor to explore
the potential benefits of the newly patented compound.

These license agreements would

expedite the process of discovering any beneficial and specific uses of chemical inventions. In
addition to spurring innovation and enhancing society, the licenses would also stimulate
commerce. The commercial value of a chemical invention may initially be unknown to the
original inventor, but through these license agreements, other scientists could enlighten the
original inventor of particular uses he had yet to discover.
Alternatively, under the Brenner Standard, inventors who have developed a new
chemical invention, but have not developed a specific use for the invention are not able to apply
for patent protection. Consequently, inventors choose not to disclose their inventions until they
discover a specified use. This results in two scenarios: (1) the inventor delays disclosure until a
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specified use is discovered or (2) the inventor abandons his research and keeps it private forever
because there is no economic incentive to disclose. Both situations are unfavorable for the
inventor and society. In the former scenario, the inventor disadvantages society by delaying the
release of beneficial information. In the latter scenario, the inventor disadvantages society by
never releasing the beneficial information.
There is one potential drawback to implementing the Story Standard for patenting
chemical inventions. There is a concern that too many scientists may apply for chemical patents
while their inventions are still in their infancy. As a result, other scientists will be excluded from
freely conducting research on an increasing amount of chemical compounds and processes. The
Story Standard may at times result in scientists cornering off certain chemical markets by
acquiring patents and then preventing other scientists from further experimentation. This may
result in a suboptimal level of scientific growth.
Utilizing the net benefit rule, however, the Story Standard’s increase is exclusive rights to
inventors outweighs the benefits lost by reduced public access. While there is a small potential
for abuse, the Story Standard, if applied to chemical inventions, would increase disclosure,
license agreements, technological advancement, and commerce in today’s society.
C.

The Average Cost Theory

The average cost theory seeks to compensate an inventor at precisely the same level as
the costs he sunk into creating the invention.148 Professor Jeffrey Harrison, viewing the problem
from the inventor’s perspective, notes that there is no reason to further incentivize an inventor
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beyond his costs because doing so will only create waste.149 Incentivizing the inventor beyond
his costs will not inspire more creativity or intellectual property; rather, it will restrict public
access to the intellectual property without inducing more creation.150 Thus, if an intellectual
property legal system rewards an inventor beyond his cost, it is creating an economic burden to
society.151
Consequently, the average cost theory aims to return the average cost of invention to the
inventor.152 The nexus where intellectual property rights meet average cost is the economically
optimal point between incentivizing inventors and allowing public access to their inventions.153
By returning an inventor’s average cost to him, the intellectual property system removes the
competitive advantage a copier may have over the inventor.154 This eliminates the economic fear
inventor’s possess when they file a public disclosure with the patent office.
D.

Applying the Average Cost Theory to the Patent Law Utility Requirement

As demonstrated above, the average cost of creation is lower under the Story Standard
than under the Brenner Standard. This is true because an inventor does not need to invest the
additional time and money necessary to develop a specific use for his chemical invention; rather,
the invention would be considered patentable from a utility perspective if the inventor could
demonstrate that the invention was simply not harmful.
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A lower average cost of invention would benefit inventors and society in multiple ways.
First, reducing the average cost of invention would allow more inventors to apply for patents.
This would result in increased public disclosures. As stated above, an increase in technological
disclosures drives an increase in licensing, information in the public domain, and commerce,
ultimately leading to a more rapid rate of scientific evolution.
According to the average cost theory, if a legal system were to lower the average cost of
creation by adopting the Story Standard for chemical inventions, then a proportional reduction in
inventor incentives should follow to avoid waste. After carefully evaluating the new average
cost of invention, Congress should reduce intellectual property rights to proportionally
compensate for the lowered average cost of invention.155 Congress could choose to, inter alia,
decrease the duration of chemical patents or reduce the exclusive rights of inventors in various
ways. This will avoid the economic waste that Professor Mark Lemley details in his analysis of
overcompensating creators.156 Therefore, if the Story Standard were applied to chemical patents,
the rate of invention would remain a constant, but intellectual property rights would be reduced
allowing greater public access to inventions. For the foregoing reasons, the Story Standard is
economically preferable to the Brenner Standard.
V.

Conclusion
Since its inception, American patent law has required inventors to demonstrate their

invention is “useful” before granting a patent. 157 Throughout American history, the legal
threshold of utility that inventors have been required to demonstrate for chemical inventions has
fluctuated between the minimalist Story Standard and the stricter Brenner Standard. From a
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legal perspective, the courts have struggled over what constitutes specific and substantial utility,
and regulators have debated whether the Brenner decision set the utility threshold at a point too
burdensome for inventors. Employing economics, this article concludes that the current Brenner
Standard hinders creation, encumbers commerce, and slows technological innovation. Both the
net benefit rule and the average cost theory dictate that the Story Standard is economically
preferable to the Brenner Standard. As such, Congress should take the appropriate steps to fully
investigate the patent utility standard across all subject matter and adopt legislation adjusting the
standard accordingly.

26

